Decisions without Sharp Probabilities

Philosophia Scientiae 19:213-225 (2015)
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Abstract

Adam Elga [Elga 2010] argues that no principle of rationality leads from unsharp probabilities to decisions. He concludes that a perfectly rational agent does not have unsharp probabilities. This paper defends unsharp probabilities. It shows how unsharp probabilities may ground rational decisions

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Paul Weirich
University of Missouri, Columbia

Citations of this work

Subjective values should be sharp.Jon Marc Asper - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6025-6043.

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