A neutral conception of reasonableness?

Episteme 3 (3):234-247 (2006)
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Abstract

Much liberal theorizing of the past twenty years has been built around a conception of neutrality and an accompanying virtue of reasonableness according to which citizens ought to be able to view public policy debates from a perspective detached from their comprehensive conceptions of the good. The view of “justifi catory neutrality” that emerges from this view is discussed and rejected as embodying controversial views about the relationship of individuals to their conceptions of the good. It is shown to be based upon a “protestant” assumption according to which conceptions of the good can be cashed out in terms of propositional beliefs. An alternative conception of reasonableness, grounded in the stable disposition of individuals to prefer social peace over conflict is described. It is argued that it better satisfies the neutralist requirement than do theories of justifi catory neutrality

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Citations of this work

On the possibility of principled moral compromise.Daniel Weinstock - 2013 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (4):537-556.
Compromise, pluralism, and deliberation.Daniel Weinstock - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (5):636-655.
Pragmatism, inquiry and political liberalism.Matthew Festenstein - 2010 - Contemporary Political Theory 9 (1):25-44.
Peace beyond Compromise.Fabian Wendt - 2013 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (4):573-593.

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References found in this work

Morals by agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
Equality and Partiality.Thomas Nagel - 1991 - New York, US: OUP Usa. Edited by Louis P. Pojman & Robert Westmoreland.

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