A decision maker's options

Philosophical Studies 44 (2):175 - 186 (1983)
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Abstract

An agent's options in a decision problem are best understood as the decisions that the agent might make. Taking options this way eliminates the gap between an option's adoption and its execution.

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Paul Weirich
University of Missouri, Columbia

Citations of this work

Decision instability.Paul Weirich - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):465 – 472.
Notes on decision theory: Old wine in new bottles.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):407 – 437.
Optimization and improvement. [REVIEW]Paul Weirich - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):467 - 475.

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
Ulysses and the Sirens.Jon Elster - 1986 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (1):82-95.

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