A Credibility-Backed Norm for Testimony

Episteme 20 (1):73-85 (2023)
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Abstract

I propose that testimony is subject to a norm that is backed by a credibility sanction: whenever the norm is violated, it is appropriate for the testifier to lose some credibility for their future testimony. This is one of a family of sanction-based norms, where violation of the norm makes it appropriate to lose some power; in this case, the power to induce belief through testimony. The applicability of the credibility norm to testimony follows from the epistemology of testimony, in that false or unjustified testimony weakens the reason for belief that is provided by the speaker's future testimony.

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Matt Weiner
University of Vermont

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References found in this work

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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Getting told and being believed.Richard Moran - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-29.

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