Practical reason and desire

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):345 – 358 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many philosophres have attempted to argue from the "Humean Theory of Motivation" (HTM) and the "Internalism Requirement" (IR) to the "Humean Theory of Practical Reason" (HTPR). This argument is familiar, but it has rarely been stated with sufficient precision. In this paper, I shall give a precise statement of this argument. I shall then rely on this statement to show two things. First, the HTPR is false: it is incompatible with some extremely plausible assumptions about weakness of will or akrasia. Second, this argument for the HTPR is invalid: even if the HTM and the IR are true, they do not provide any support whatsoever to the HTPR.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Feeling pain for the very first time: The normative knowledge argument.Guy Kahane - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):20-49.
The Humean theory of reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 195--219.
Because I Believe It’s the Right Thing to Do.Joshua May - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):791-808.
Reasons for actions and desires.Ulrike Heuer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (1):43–63.
Weakness of will.Frank Jackson - 1984 - Mind 93 (369):1-18.
Defending Desire: Scanlon’s Anti-Humeanism.Steven Arkonovich - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):499-519.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
154 (#119,496)

6 months
7 (#425,192)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ralph Wedgwood
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton University
Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.
Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Because I Believe It’s the Right Thing to Do.Joshua May - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):791-808.
Instrumental rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:280-309.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Skepticism about practical reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
Reasons and motivation: John Broome.John Broome - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.

View all 13 references / Add more references