Doxastic Correctness

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234 (2013)
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If beliefs are subject to a basic norm of correctness—roughly, to the principle that a belief is correct only if the proposition believed is true—how can this norm guide believers in forming their beliefs? Answer: this norm guides believers indirectly: believers are directly guided by requirements of rationality—which are themselves explained by this norm of correctness. The fundamental connection between rationality and correctness is probabilistic. Incorrectness comes in degrees; for beliefs, these degrees of incorrectness are measured by quadratic scoring rules, such as the so-called Brier score. This account is defended against objections; and its implications for suspension of judgement are explored



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Ralph Wedgwood
University of Southern California

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On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
A treatise on probability.John Maynard Keynes - 1921 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.

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