Explanation And Solution In The Inclosure Argument

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):353-357 (2010)
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Abstract

In a recent article, Emil Badici contends that the inclosure schema substantially fails as an analysis of the paradoxes of self-reference because it is question-begging. The main purpose of this note is to show that Badici's critique highlights a necessity condition for the success of dialectic about paradoxes. The inclosure argument respects this condition and remains solvent

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Zach Weber
University of Otago

Citations of this work

Finding Tolerance without Gluts.Jc Beall - 2014 - Mind 123 (491):791-811.
Inference to the Best Contradiction?Sam Baron - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

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References found in this work

Beyond the Limits of Thought.Graham Priest - 1995 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond.Richard Routley - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):173-179.
Presupposition.David I. Beaver - 1997 - In Johan van Bentham & Alice ter Meulen (eds.), Handbook of Logic and Language. MIT Press.
Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond.Richard Routley - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (4):539-552.
Beyond the Limits of Thought.Graham Priest - 1995 - Philosophy 71 (276):308-310.

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