Evilism, moral rationalism, and reasons internalism

Abstract

I show that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and essentially omnimalevolent being is impossible given only two metaethical assumptions (viz., moral rationalism and reasons internalism). I then argue (pace Stephen Law) that such an impossibility undercuts Law’s (Relig Stud 46(3):353–373, 2010) evil god challenge.

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Author's Profile

Christopher Gregory Weaver
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Kellogg Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.

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Citations of this work

Psychophysical Harmony: A New Argument for Theism.Brian Cutter & Dustin Crummett - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
Meeting the Evil God Challenge.Ben Page & Max Baker-Hytch - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):489-514.
Religious Disagreement, Religious Experience, and the Evil God Hypothesis.Kirk Lougheed - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1):173-190.

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