Self-knowledge and the limits of transparency

Analysis 67 (3):223–230 (2007)
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Abstract

A number of recent accounts of our first-person knowledge of our attitudes give a central role to transparency - our capacity to answer the question of whether we have an attitude by answering the question of whether to have it. In this paper I raise a problem for such accounts, by showing that there are clear cases of first-person knowledge of attitudes which are not transparent.

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10.1093/analys/67.3.223

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Jonathan Way
University of Southampton

Citations of this work

"How to Think Several Thoughts at Once: Content Plurality in Mental Action".Antonia Peacocke - 2023 - In Michael Brent & Lisa Miracchi Titus (eds.), Mental Action and the Conscious Mind. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 31-60.
The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.
How we know what we intend.Sarah K. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.
Higher-Order Evidence in Aesthetics.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):143-155.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

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