Abstract

In the first part of this dissertation, I argue against theories of meaning that arise from a computational theory of the mind. These theories take a "head-first" approach to meaning, arguing that mental representations are the primary bearers of semantic content, and that expressions in natural language get their meaning derivatively. I consider, in particular, theories developed by Jerry Fodor, Fred Dretske and Gilbert Harman. These theories run into problems accounting for natural kind terms, misrepresentation, and, most importantly, communication and understanding. ;I advocate an alternative approach to semantic theory that considers language the primary bearer of meaning. I argue that the semantics of natural language derives, not from expression of mental representations, but from social practices carried out within a community. My view is based in part on the work of the Soviet philosopher E. V. Ilyenkov. In the final chapter, I examine the theory of the mind, developed by the psychologist L. S. Vygotsky, that underlies Ilyenkov's philosophy, but conclude that a social theory of meaning for natural language does not require a corresponding social theory of the mind