Hurley's Transcendental Enactivism

Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (5-6):12-38 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Susan Hurley (1998a, 2003a, 2008) argues that our capacities for perception, agency and thought are essentially interdependent and co-emerge from a tangle of sensorimotor processes that are both cause and effect of the web of interactive and communicative practices they weave us into. In this paper, I reconstruct this view and its main motivations, with a particular focus on three important aspects. First, Hurley argues that an essential aspect of conscious perception – its perspectival unity – constitutively depends on agency. That is, agency is a transcendental condition on the possibility of perception (§3). Second, understanding why this dependence obtains involves understanding why perception and agency emerge together, and how they do so on the basis of a web of interrelated capacities for sensorimotor control (§2, §4). Third, understanding these first two aspects of Hurley’s view is the key to understanding the sophisticated interplay between i) her arguments for the causal interdependence of sensory input and motor output, and ii) her arguments for the essential interdependence of perception and agency.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Understanding 'sensorimotor understanding'.Tom Roberts - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):101-111.
Achieving Transparency: An Argument For Enactivism.Dave Ward - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):650-680.
Perception and action: The taste test.Alessandra Tanesini & Richard Gray - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):718-734.
The Phenomenology of Sensorimotor Understanding.Ken Pepper - 2014 - In John Mark Bishop & Andrew Owen Martin (eds.), Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory. Springer. pp. 53-65.
Color and the duplication assumption.Erik Myin - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):61-77.
A New Imagery Debate: Enactive and Sensorimotor Accounts.Lucia Foglia & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):181-196.
Knowing what? Radical versus conservative enactivism.Daniel D. Hutto - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):389-405.
Sensorimotor enactivism and temporal experience.David Silverman - 2013 - Adaptive Behavior 21 (3):151-158.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-06-22

Downloads
352 (#33,147)

6 months
21 (#53,621)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dave Ward
University of Edinburgh

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references