Three-valued semantic pluralism: a defense of a three-valued solution to the sorites paradox

Synthese 195 (10):4441-4476 (2018)
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Abstract

Disagreeing with most authors on vagueness, the author proposes a solution that he calls ‘three-valued semantic pluralism’ to the age-old sorites paradox. In essence, it is a three-valued semantics for a first-order vague language with identity with the additional suggestion that a vague language has more than one correct interpretation. Unlike the traditional three-valued approach to a vague language, three-valued semantic pluralism can accommodate the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness and the phenomenon of penumbral connection when equipped with ‘suitable conditionals’. The author also shows that three-valued semantic pluralism is a natural consequence of a restricted form of the Tolerance principle ) and a few related ideas, and argues that ) is well-motivated by considerations about how we learn, teach, and use vague predicates.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.

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