On physicalism and algorithmism: Can machines think?

Philosophia Mathematica 1 (2):97-138 (1993)
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Abstract

This essay discusses a number of questions which arise from attempts to reduce the mental to the physical or the mental and the physical to the computational. It makes, in an organized way, several basic distinctions between different kinds of accounts of the mind. It reconstructs and elaborates many discussions between Gödel and the author on the nature of the human mind, with special emphasis on its mathematical capabilities.

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Hao Wang
University of Amsterdam

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