Modal Fictionalism and Hale's Dilemma Against It

The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:51-56 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Gideon Rosen proposes a view called "modal fictionalism" which Rosen thinks has all the benefits of modal realism without its ontological costs. Whereas modal realists have a paraphrase r(0) of a modal claim "0", modal fictionalists claim that the correct translation of "0" is rather the result of prefixing "according to the hypothesis of a plurality of worlds" to r(0). Rosen takes the prefix to be primitive and defines other modal notions in terms of it. Bob Hale, however, thinks the fictionalist's project suffers from a "simple" dilemma. The purpose of this paper is to show that Rosen is right in taking the prefix as primitive and Hale is wrong in thinking fictionalism as being threatened by the dilemma.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Why modal fictionalism is not self-defeating.Richard Woodward - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):273 - 288.
Modal fictionalism and possible-worlds discourse.David Liggins - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):151-60.
Modal Fictionalism: A Simple Dilemma.Bob Hale - 1995 - Analysis 55 (2):63--7.
A Yablovian Dilemma.Richard Woodward - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):200-209.
Modal fictionalism and compositionality.Josh Dever - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (3):223 - 251.
Is modal fictionalism artificial?Richard Woodward - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):535-550.
The Modal Ontological Argument Meets Modal Fictionalism.Ted Parent - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):338-352.
Modal fictionalism.Gideon Rosen - 1990 - Mind 99 (395):327-354.
Modal Fictionalism Fixed.Gideon Rosen - 1995 - Analysis 55 (2):67-73.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-12-02

Downloads
104 (#154,383)

6 months
1 (#1,027,696)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references