The Epistemological Status of Transpersonal Psychology The Data-Base Argument Revisited

Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2):1-2 (2010)
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Abstract

The present paper argues that neither the autophenomenological nor the heterophenomenological approach works in order to do justice to the reality of experiences, because neither approach escapes phenomenological scepticism. By regarding the potentials of neuroscience and transpersonal psychology in addition to analysing the epistemology of experiencing, it is argued that an interdisciplinary-transpersonal psychological method is preferable that covers first- second- and third-person accounts. Furthermore, it is argued that, in order to make such an approach fruitful for interdisciplinary research, a pragmatic view of reality that takes experiences seriously is needed

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