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The Doctrine of Illicit Intentions
Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (1):39-67 (2006)
Abstract
According to the Doctrine of Illicit Intentions, it is impermissible both to form and then to act on an illicit intention. An intention is illicit, roughly, if it causes the agent who has it to be, in a certain way, disposed to perform actions that are impermissible. If the range of actions an agent might be directed to perform by an intention includes impermissible actions, then it may be impermissible to form or act on that intention even if, in the end, the agent performs no action that is impermissible (other than forming and acting on an illicit intention itself).DOI
10.1111/j.1088-4963.2006.00052.x
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Citations of this work
The Doctrine of Double Effect: Intention and Permissibility.William J. FitzPatrick - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (3):183-196.
The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing that Intentions are Irrelevant to Permissibility.Douglas Husak - 2009 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (1):51-70.
Blameworthiness and constitutive control.Rachel Achs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3695-3715.
The Medical Exception to the Prohibition of Killing: A Matter of the Right Intention?Govert Den Hartogh - 2019 - Ratio Juris 32 (2):157-176.
Comments on Doug Husak: The Low Cost of Recognizing (and of Ignoring) the Limited Relevance of Intentions to Permissibility.Alec Walen - 2009 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (1):71-78.
References found in this work
Physician‐assisted suicide: Two moral arguments.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1999 - Ethics 109 (3):497-518.
The Doctrine of Double Effect: Problems of Interpretation.Nancy Davis - 1984 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (2):107.
Who is entitled to double effect?Joseph Boyle - 1991 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (5):475-494.
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