Abstract

The thesis of this study is that a theological account of doctrine is rooted in a more fundamental philosophical stance. In this work, I examine Bernard Lonergan's account of doctrine in light of his developing philosophical thought on the nature of truth and the understanding of historical subjects. I frame my study, furthermore, by outlining three accounts of doctrine which differ markedly from Lonergan's own, and by contrasting these accounts with Lonergan's on the basis of philosophical foundations. ;Methodologically, I approach this work with a two-fold concern. In the first place, I am interested in giving an accurate description of Lonergan's account of doctrine in light of his developing philosophical and methodological agenda. Secondly, I am concerned with evaluating Lonergan's contribution in relation to three other contemporary, and at times conflicting, accounts of doctrine. In this, my intention is not to give an exhaustive historical survey of Lonergan's work, but rather to illustrate by historical example the emergence of Lonergan's mature position on doctrine. This is done both in view of supporting the thesis that philosophical stance influences theological conclusions, and with the purpose of evaluating Lonergan's own contribution in this area. ;With that goal in mind, my study is divided into five chapters. In chapter one, I set out a theological context from which to consider Lonergan's thought. Here I present three theological positions on the nature of doctrine from E. L. Mascall, Gerald O'Collins, and George Lindbeck; and in each case I consider the theologian's philosophical base. ;The next three chapters I devote to the philosophical foundations and theological articulation of Lonergan's own position on doctrine. Chapter two deals with Lonergan's thought on the connection between theological system and doctrinal truth. Chapter three considers Lonergan's developing position on cognitional process and its relevance for theological understanding. And chapter four focuses on Lonergan's increased interest in the subject and the search for meaning. Here, I give special attention to Lonergan's position on the connection between authentic subjectivity and the ongoing life of a doctrinal tradition. ;My study ends in chapter five with a summary of Lonergan's account of doctrine, and with my own suggestion regarding its place alongside those three alternative accounts with which I began. ;I conclude my work with a confirmation of the thesis that one's philosophical stance inevitably influences the shape of one's theological account of doctrine. This I contend is illustrated clearly by Lonergan's own procedure. But in addition to illustrating the relationship of philosophy to theology, I suggest that Lonergan's foundations are more surely established than the others which I have examined, and so that Lonergan's theological account of doctrine is preferable to them. Lonergan's position, I conclude, uniquely respects both the enduring truth of doctrine, and the historical subject's ongoing understanding of that truth