Punishment without Blame, Shame, or Just Deserts

In Matthew C. Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 465-487 (2022)
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Abstract

Punishment is fundamentally unfair, never justly deserved, and cannot be eliminated. The deep Belief in a Just World, the subject of extensive psychological research, makes it difficult for us to accept the fact that we live in an unjust world. Belief in moral responsibility is designed to protect our comfortable belief in a just world, but that comfort comes at the price of blaming victims and blocking deeper inquiry. Facing the disturbing fact of unavoidable injustice motivates us to take effective steps to minimize injustice: to seek out the deeper causes of criminal behavior and fix them, and to treat those we must unjustly punish (through coercive isolation) with respect, concern, and the least possible discomfort.

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