Abstract

I account for Hobbes's references to the laws of nature as both theorems concerning one's conservation and defence and as commands, combining essential characteristics of two seemingly incompatible interpretations, as a first step towards a more comprehensive reading of Hobbes. J. W. N. Watkins attempts to address Hobbes's reference to the laws of nature as theorems by characterizing the laws of nature as Kantian hypothetical imperatives. Such an interpretation is consistent with Hobbes's description of human psychology as egoistic. In A. E. Taylor's reading, however, Hobbes's ethical theory must be disengaged from his egoistic psychology. The laws of nature, according to Taylor, must be understood as commands, and in terms of a theism he believes is at work in Hobbes's theory. Each of these interpretations alone provides a compelling but incomplete account of the laws of nature. Watkins accounts for the prudential character of the laws of nature, but fails to address Hobbes's references to them as commands. Taylor accounts for the command character of the laws of nature, but discounts the egoistic psychology Hobbes presents. An account that addresses the references to the laws of nature as both theorems and commands, and yet comprehends essential aspects of both Watkins' and Taylor's interpretations, can provide a more comprehensive reading of Hobbes