Neurath's ship: The constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories of rationality

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):273-274 (2011)
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Abstract

I defend the claim that in psychological theories concerned with theoretical or practical rationality there is a constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories: Normative theories provide idealized descriptive accounts of rational agents. However, we need to resist the temptation to collapse descriptive theories with any specific normative theory. I show how a partial separation is possible.

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Citations of this work

The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning.Michael Waldmann (ed.) - 2017 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Moral judgment.Michael R. Waldmann, Jonas Nagel & Alex Wiegmann - 2012 - The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning.
The Many Facets of the Theory of Rationality.Wolfgang Spohn - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):249-264.

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