Normativity and the will: selected papers on moral psychology and practical reason

New York: Oxford University Press (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Normativity and the Will collects fourteen important papers on moral psychology and practical reason by R. Jay Wallace, one of the leading philosophers currently working in these areas. The papers explore the interpenetration of normative and psychological issues in a series of debates that lie at the heart of moral philosophy. Themes that are addressed include reason, desire, and the will; responsibility, identification, and emotion; and the relation between morality and other normative domains. Wallace's treatments of these topics are at once sophisticated and engaging. Taken together, they constitute an advertisement for a distinctive way of pursuing issues in moral psychology and the theory of practical reason, and they articulate and defend a unified framework for thinking about those issues. The volume also features a helpful new introduction

Other Versions

original Jay Wallace, R. (2006) "Normativity and Will: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason". Oxford University Press UK

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 97,197

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
150 (#133,738)

6 months
7 (#961,953)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

R. Jay Wallace
University of California, Berkeley

Citations of this work

De dicto desires and morality as fetish.Vanessa Carbonell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):459-477.
Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism.Paul Katsafanas - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):620-660.
What is self-control?Edmund Henden - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):69 – 90.
What skill is not.Evan Riley - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):344-354.

View all 31 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references