Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):365-379 (2009)

Authors
Lee Walters
University of Southampton
Abstract
Is A & C sufficient for the truth of ‘if A were the case, C would be the case’? Jonathan Bennett thinks not, although the counterexample he gives is inconsistent with his own account of counterfactuals. In any case, I argue that anyone who accepts the case of Morgenbesser's coin, as Bennett does, should reject Bennett’s counterexample. Moreover, I show that the principle underlying his counterexample is unmotivated and indeed false. More generally, I argue that Morgenbesser’s coin commits us to the sufficiency of A & C for the truth of the corresponding counterfactual.
Keywords Counterfactuals
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2009.00275.x
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David Kellogg Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Conditional Heresies.Fabrizio Cariani & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):251-282.
An Argument for Conjunction Conditionalization.Lee Walters & Robert Williams - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):573-588.
Possible World Semantics and True-True Counterfactuals.Lee Walters - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):322-346.
Counterfactuals and Arbitrariness.Moritz Schulz - 2014 - Mind 123 (492):1021-1055.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

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