Artificial Intelligence and Law 11 (1):1-43 (2003)
AbstractIn some recent cases in Anglo-American law juries ruled contrary to an expert's testimony even though that testimony was never challenged, contradicted or questioned in the trial. These cases are shown to raise some theoretical questions about formal dialogue systems in computational dialectical systems for legal argumentation of the kind recently surveyed by Bench-Capon (1997) and Hage (2000) in this journal. In such systems, there is a burden of proof, meaning that if the respondent questions an argument, the proponent is obliged to offer some support for it give it up. But what should happen in a formal system of dialogue if the proponent puts forward an argument and the respondent fails to critically question it, and simply moves on to another issue? Is this some kind of fault that should have implications? Should it be taken to imply that, by default, the respondent has conceded the argument? What, if anything, should be the outcome of such a failure to question in a formal dialogue system of argumentation? These questions are considered by examining some legal cases of expert opinion testimony in relation rules for formal dialectical argumentation systems.
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References found in this work
Commitment in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning.Douglas Neil Walton & Erik C. W. Krabbe - 1995 - Albany, NY, USA: State University of New York Press.
The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation.Chaïm Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca - 1969 - Notre Dame, IN, USA: Notre Dame University Press.
Cognitive Carpentry: A Blueprint for How to Build a Person.John L. Pollock - 1995 - MIT Press.
The New Dialectic: Conversational Contexts of Argument.Douglas Walton - 1998 - University of Toronto Press.
Citations of this work
The Burden of Proof and Its Role in Argumentation.Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford - 2007 - Argumentation 21 (1):39-61.
On the Importance of Questioning Within the Ideal Model of Critical Discussion.Fernando Leal - 2020 - Argumentation 34 (4):405-431.
How to Make and Defend a Proposal in a Deliberation Dialogue.Douglas Walton - 2006 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 14 (3):177-239.
Advances in the Theory of Argumentation Schemes and Critical Questions.David Godden & Douglas Walton - 2007 - Informal Logic 27 (3):267-292.
The Burden of Criticism: Consequences of Taking a Critical Stance.Jan Albert van Laar & Erik C. W. Krabbe - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (2):201-224.
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