Defending Liberal Neutrality

Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (1996)
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Abstract

Liberal political theory is characterized by the view that the power of the state should be limited. One important limitation arises from the neutralist ideal, which is the view that the state should not attempt to promote or discourage any conceptions of the good life held by citizens, but should instead limit itself to providing a stable and safe framework within which individual citizens can pursue the good life as they see it. This liberal view is challenged by the perfectionist model of the state, which holds that one of the proper functions of the state is to promote truly elevated or virtuous ways of life and to discourage worthless ones. ;Many philosophers, liberal and otherwise, think that liberal neutrality is untenable and must be abandoned. I do not, and I contribute to the defense of liberal neutrality in the following ways. First, I distinguish several different senses in which a state might be said to be neutral, only two of which the liberal should endorse. Second, I critique the most common ways in which liberals have defended neutrality. These include arguments based on the value of autonomy and on the need for the state to respect its citizens, and, in Rawls' case, the argument from political legitimacy. These arguments are, I claim, all inconclusive. ;Third, I present an argument for liberal neutrality that builds on claims, first put forward by Locke and Mill, about structural features of the good life for human beings. Locke's idea is that people cannot be compelled to be virtuous, while Mill holds that the objectively best life for a person depends on particular characteristics of that person and her life. When properly developed these claims build a consequentialist case in favor of a largely neutral state which pursues only "soft perfectionist" policies. Such a state, which would attempt to develop and encourage the constructive use of citizens' capacity for rational reflection and would otherwise leave decisions about the good life up to individual citizens, is best suited to reaching the perfectionist's goal

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