Freud and Philosophy of Mind, Volume 1: Reconstructing the Argument for Unconscious Mental States

Cham: Springer Verlag (2018)
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Abstract

This book consists of a focused and systematic analysis of Freud’s implicit argument for unconscious mental states. The author employs the unique approach of applying contemporary philosophical methods, especially Kripke-Putnam essentialism, in analyzing Freud’s argument. The book elaborates how Freud transformed the intentionality theory of his Cartesian teacher Franz Brentano into what is essentially a sophisticated modern view of the mind. Indeed, Freud redirected Brentano's analysis of consciousness as intentionality into a view of consciousness-independent intentionalism about the mental that in effect set the agenda for latter-twentieth-century philosophy of mind.

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9783319963426   9783319963433   3030404358   3319963422

DOI

10.1007/978-3-319-96343-3
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Chapters

Freud’s Argument, Part 1: Phenomenal Representationality as the Essence of the Mental

In this chapter, I begin my reconstruction of Freud’s positive argument for the existence of unconscious mental states. Freud attempts to show that the essence of the mental is brain representationality, not consciousness. A requirement for mounting such an essentialist argument is to identify the m... see more

Freud’s Direct Arguments Against the Consciousness Criterion

Freud provides a number of arguments directly against the consciousness criterion—the view that mind equals consciousness. In this chapter, I evaluate these critical arguments and argue that, although many understand these to be the primary arguments Freud marshals for his positive position, they fa... see more

Cartesianism Without the Consciousness Criterion: Solving the Mystery of Freud’s Missing Account of the Mental

How did Freud transform Brentano’s version of the Cartesian tradition? This chapter provides a broad initial sketch of the basic elements of Freud’s account of the mental, pinpointing how he reacted to each of the central tenets of the Cartesian/Brentano tradition. I argue that Freud retained most o... see more

Brentano, Freud’s Philosophical Interlocutor

The Cartesian philosopher Franz Brentano was Freud’s teacher when Freud was a university student. Recent scholarship has clarified Brentano’s theory of the mental and illuminated the surprisingly extensive relationship between Freud and Brentano, provoking renewed assessment of Brentano’s influence ... see more

Freud’s Response to the Semantic Objection: Concepts, Essentialism, and the Definition of “Mental”

In response to the semantic objection, Freud must show that the concept “unconscious mental state” is at least conceptually coherent. Preferably, Freud should start from a definition of “mental” that is shared with his Cartesian opponents to provide a common basis for discussion. To identify what fo... see more

The Semantic Objection to Freud’s Thesis

A common argument against the existence of unconscious mental states before, during, and after Freud’s time was what I call the “semantic objection,” that ‘mind’ simply means “consciousness” so postulating unconscious mental states is self-contradictory and a misuse of the term ‘mental.’ Freud retur... see more

“Unconscious” as “Mental and Not Conscious”: Why Repression, the Dynamic Unconscious, and Psychopathology Are Irrelevant to Freud’s Philosophical Argument

An obstacle to understanding Freud’s philosophical contribution is that he is primarily known as a clinician and clinical theoretician who put forward theories of repression and the dynamic unconscious to explain the symptoms of psychopathology. Many of his admirers prize that strictly clinical imag... see more

Freud and the Transformations of Psychology and Philosophy of Mind

Whether mental states are limited to conscious experience or encompass unconscious states was arguably the single most important and divisive question to confront psychology at its inception as a science. Both psychology and philosophy of mind changed radically as a result of the ensuing debate, fro... see more

Introduction: Should Freud be Taken Seriously as a Philosopher of Mind?

Sigmund Freud is not generally considered an important figure in the history of philosophy of mind. In this book, I argue that this is a mistake and that implicit within Freud’s scattered comments on unconscious mental states is a sophisticated and still-relevant philosophical argument against the C... see more

Conclusion: The Freudian Century in Philosophy of Mind

The analysis of Freud’s argument for unconscious mental states reveals Freud to be both a materialist and a representationalist about the mental who postulates a theoretical entity of brain representationality as the essence of the mental and is a quasi-mysterian about consciousness. I consider in t... see more

Freud’s Argument, Part 2: Brain Representationality as the Essence of the Mental

In this chapter, I complete my reconstruction of Freud’s positive argument for the existence of unconscious mental states by providing a step-by-step account of Freud’s philosophical argument that the mental-relevant essence of consciousness is brain representationality. I consider Freud’s understan... see more

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The ins and outs of conscious belief.Sam Coleman - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):517-548.

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