Simpson’s paradox and the Fisher-newcomb problem

Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1):185-194 (1991)

Abstract

It is shown that the Fisher smoking problem and Newcomb's problem are decisiontheoretically identical, each having at its core an identical case of Simpson's paradox for certain probabilities. From this perspective, incorrect solutions to these problems arise from treating them as cases of decisionmaking under risk, while adopting certain global empirical conditional probabilities as the relevant subjective probabihties. The most natural correct solutions employ the methodology of decisionmaking under uncertainty with lottery acts, with certain local empirical conditional probabilities adopted as the relevant subjective probabilities

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,766

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-04-04

Downloads
55 (#210,382)

6 months
1 (#386,989)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

How Braess' Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem.A. D. Irvine - 1993 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (2):141 – 160.
How Braess' Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem: Not!Louis Marinoff - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3):217 – 237.
An Epistemic Principle Which Solves Newcomb’s Paradox.Keith Lehrer & Vann Mcgee - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1):197-217.
Probabilistic Causality and Simpson's Paradox.Richard Otte - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (1):110-125.
Evidential Decision Theory and Medical Newcomb Problems.Arif Ahmed - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):191-198.
Newcomb's Hidden Regress.Stephen Maitzen & Garnett Wilson - 2003 - Theory and Decision 54 (2):151-162.
Causal Probability.John L. Pollock - 2002 - Synthese 132 (1-2):143 - 185.