BCI-Mediated Action, Blame, and Responsibility

American Journal of Bioethics: Neuroscience 11 (2020)
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Abstract

Rainey et al. (forthcoming) discuss the complications that arise with assigning responsibility for brain computer interface (BCI)-mediated actions. Because BCI-mediated actions can differ from non-BCI-mediated actions in terms of control and foreseeability, the authors suggest that our ethical and legal evaluation of these actions may differ in important ways. While we take no issue with the authors’ discussion or conclusion, we also recognize the difficulty of grappling with the relationship between control, foreseeability, and moral responsibility practices, even without the additional complications introduced by BCI-mediation. In this commentary, we therefore consider BCI-mediated action against the backdrop of a different--perhaps less murky--normative framework: blame.

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Author Profiles

Kit Rempala
Loyola University, Chicago
Joseph Vukov
Loyola University, Chicago

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References found in this work

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Moral Luck.Thomas Nagel - 1993 - In Daniel Statman (ed.), Moral Luck. State University of New York Press. pp. 141--166.

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