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Single-case probabilities and content-neutral norms: a reply to Gigerenzer
Cognition 81 (1):105-111 (2001)
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Citations of this work
The “Rationality Wars” in Psychology: Where They Are and Where They Could Go.Thomas Sturm - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):66-81.
The natural frequency hypothesis and evolutionary arguments.Yuichi Amitani - 2015 - Mind and Society 15 (1):1-19.
The Frequency Hypothesis and Evolutionary Arguments.Yuichi Amitani - 2008 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 41 (1):79-94.
References found in this work
A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 263-293.
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.
The propensity interpretation of probability.Karl R. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):25-42.
A propensity interpretation of probability.Karl Popper - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge.
On the reality of cognitive illusions.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (3):582-591.
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