Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky

Cognition 76 (3):179-193 (2000)
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10.1016/s0010-0277(99)00084-0

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Peter Vranas
University of Wisconsin, Madison

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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