Abstract

From 1942-1981, the field of philosophy of education was affected at various times by the precepts of both general philosophy and education. Analytic philosophy of education, an orientation in philosophy of education which took form as an attempt to make philosophy of education philosophically acceptable and which flourished from approximately 1959-1968, borrowed from general philosophy many of the principles and methods of its analytic movement. The work produced in philosophy of education during its analytic phase focused on conceptual and linguistic aspects of educational theory and practice, and provided new insight and understanding of the concepts and language which determined the structure of educational theories and guided actual educational practice. By 1970, however, educational philosophers had become critical of the analytic orientation of philosophy of education. They claimed that analysis had produced results which were trivial or irrelevant, and which failed to take account of the normative interests of educators. Because of the criticisms of analysis, work produced within the field gradually emphasized an eclectic rather than an analytic approach to the philosophical investigation of educational issues. The new eclectic approach located specific educational issues within subareas of general philosophy, and acknowledged educators' normative concerns. ;Yet there is a problem with the transition from analytic to eclectic philosophy of education. If the cause of the transition can be traced to what educational philosophers regarded as the faults of analysis, then seemingly the faults should be found in the analytic work done in the field of philosophy of education. The problem, however, is that those faults, once found in analytic work in educational philosophy, cannot be described as faults given the principles, processes, and products which characterize analytic philosophy. This dissertation attempts to establish the thesis that the criticisms which educational philosophers directed against analysis cannot be justified when the aims and ends of analysis are made clear, and consequently that the transition from analytic to eclectic philosophy of education cannot be explained by citing the shortcomings of analysis