Public Health Ethics 10 (2):148-156 (2017)

Authors
Alex Voorhoeve
London School of Economics
Abstract
When one faces competing claims of varying strength on public resources for health, which claims count? This paper proposes the following answer. One should count, or aggregate, a person’s claim just in case one could sympathize with her desire to prioritize her own claim over the strongest competing claim. It argues that this principle yields appealing case judgments and has a plausible grounding in both sympathetic identification with each person, taken separately, and respect for the person for whom most is at stake. It also defends this principle against several heretofore unanswered objections.
Keywords Aggregation  Distributive justice  Sympathy
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Reprint years 2016, 2017
DOI 10.1093/phe/phw006
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

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Citations of this work BETA

Partial Aggregation in Ethics.Joe Horton - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):1-12.
On Ex Ante Contractualism.Korbinian Rüger - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (3).
How (Not) to Make Trade-Offs Between Health and Other Goods.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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