Abstract

The contribution starts with the observation that Kant mentioned human dignity in his main works with a great variety of emphasis. In the Groundwork of 1785, we find significant treatment and again in the Doctrine of Virtue of 1798, but none in the Critique of Practical Reason of 1788 or in the Doctrine of Right of 1797. This difference in emphasis needs explanation. In the Groundwork human dignity is not attached to the second formula of the categorical imperative, the formula of self-purposefulness, as is often assumed, but to the third formula of a kingdom of ends. It is there explained as self-legislation. This placement also needs explanation, which this article attempts to provide. In the Doctrine of Virtue, human dignity is then explained as self-purposefulness. Kant thus changed his understanding of human dignity from the Groundwork to the Doctrine of Virtue. The question is: Why?