Succeeding competently: towards an anti-luck condition for achievement

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):394-418 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

ABSTRACTAchievements are among the things that make a life good. Assessing the plausibility of this intuitive claim requires an account of the nature of achievements. One necessary condition for achievement appears to be that the achieving agent acted competently, i.e. was not just lucky. I begin by critically assessing existing accounts of anti-luck conditions for achievements in both the ethics and epistemology literature. My own proposal is that a goal is reached competently, only if the actions of the would-be-achiever make success likely, and that this is the reason why she acts that way.

Other Versions

No versions found

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-07-25

Downloads
856 (#27,213)

6 months
162 (#24,630)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Hasko von Kriegstein
Toronto Metropolitan University

Citations of this work

Doubts about Duty as a Secondary Motive.Jessica Isserow - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):276-298.
Ability’s Two Dimensions of Robustness.Sophie Kikkert - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (3):348-357.
Achievement and Enhancement.Lisa Forsberg & Anthony Skelton - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):322-338.
Moral Luck and Control.Steven D. Hales - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):42-58.
Perfection and Success.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2024 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 11.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.

View all 78 references / Add more references