Hedging your ifs and vice versa

Abstract

“Any theory of conditionals has consequences for less-than-certain judgements. Something is proposed of the form: If A, B is true iff A*B. If a clear-headed person, free from confusions of a logical, linguistic or referential sort, can be nearly sure that A*B yet far from sure that if A, B, or vice versa, then this is strong evidence against the proposal.” (Edgington 1995/2007).

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Author Profiles

Kai von Fintel
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Anthony Gillies
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

The restrictor view, without covert modals.Ivano Ciardelli - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (2):293-320.
No fact of the middle.Justin Khoo - 2021 - Noûs 56 (4):1000-1022.
Credences for strict conditionals.Malte Willer - 2025 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110 (1):23-50.

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