Beliefs, make-beliefs, and making believe that beliefs are not make-beliefs

Synthese 199 (1-2):5061-5078 (2021)
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Abstract

In this paper I want to hold, first, that one may suitably reconstruct the relevant kind of mental representational states that fiction typically involves, make-beliefs, as contextually unreal beliefs that, outside fiction, are either matched or non-matched by contextually real beliefs. Yet moreover, I want to claim that the kind of make-believe that may yield the mark of fictionality is not Kendall Walton’s invitation or prescription to imagine. Indeed, in order to appeal in terms of make-believe to a specific form of imagination that fiction distinctively involves, one must move away from the realm of norms in order to attain a cognitive realm; namely, one must look at a specific form of metarepresentational state. This metarepresentational state of make-believe is a second-order representation that is about both real beliefs and make-beliefs, as the first-order representations it compares by acknowledging their contextual distinctness.

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Alberto Voltolini
University of Turin

Citations of this work

Did the Greeks believe in their myths?Alberto Voltolini - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.

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