A Minimalist Solution to Jørgensen's Dilemma

Ratio Juris 12 (1):59-79 (1999)
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Abstract

This article develops a fresh approach to Jørgensen's Dilemma on the basis of Paul Horwich's “minimalist” view that our notion of truth is implicitly defined by the instances of the equivalence schema “The proposition that p is true if and only if p.” The “deflationary” claim that the truth predicate, far from referring to any deep property of propositions, merely plays the logical function of enabling us to take certain attitudes (e.g., acceptance or rejection) towards propositions the content of which we are not completely acquainted with or do not want to state openly is argued to lend powerful support to the claim that normative reasoning is concerned with the “transmission” of truth and falsity in the very sense in which descriptive reasoning is commonly taken to be. This result is all the more valuable since the “minimal” sense in which normative propositions are ascribed the capability of being either true or false involves no questionable ontological commitment to the existence of a “world of norms” as opposed to the familiar world of objects and their properties.

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Giorgio Volpe
University of Bologna

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