Fehler im Haus der Vernunft

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1):73-95 (2009)
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The first part of the essay tries to show that Davidson's explanation of irrationality in terms of a fragmentation of the mind is not compatible with interpretationist premises of his own theory. Instead of adopting the conception of two semi-autonomous departments of the mind, I argue for an explanation of strong forms of irrationality based on two kinds of contentful mental states: functionally individuated representational states and states whose content depends on a rationalizing interpretation. Akrasia – as a form of irrationality caused by mental states that are not propositionally transparent – seems to fit neatly into that picture



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Arational actions.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):57-68.
Arational Actions.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):57-68.

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