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Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato
New York, US: Oup Usa (2012)
Abstract
Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato explores a Socratic intuition about belief, doxa -- belief is "shameful." In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Vogt shows how deeply this proposal differs from contemporary views, but that it nevertheless speaks to intuitions we are likely to share with Plato, ancient skeptics, and Stoic epistemologistsAuthor's Profile
Reprint years
2015
ISBN(s)
9780199916818 0199916810 9780190277192 019027719X 9780199980291
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Chapters
Introduction
How do philosophers in the Socratic tradition think about doxa, belief? It is argued that belief is, for Plato's Socrates as as well as for the skeptics and Stoics, a deficient cognitive attitude. On this conception of belief, knowledge does not involve belief. The Introduction sketches wa... see more
Why Beliefs Are Never True: A Reconstruction of Stoic Epistemology
According to the Stoics, beliefs are not evaluated as “true” or “false.” This aspect of Stoic epistemology, though rather stark, has not been noted by interpreters. The chapter is devoted to explaining and reconstructing it. The Stoic wise person does not hold any beliefs. In aiming for kn... see more
Concluding Remarks: Skepticism and Relativism
The Concluding Remarks offer an overview of ingredients relevant to Pyrrhonian skepticism and its history—and thus, ingredients relevant to a perspective that is defended as plausible throughout the book: a commitment to Socratic investigation and epistemic caution, engagement with metaphy... see more
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Citations of this work
The Stoic Appeal to Expertise: Platonic Echoes in the Reply to Indistinguishability.Simon Shogry - 2021 - Apeiron 54 (2):129-159.
The Elusive Third Way: The Pyrrhonian Illumination in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty.Roger E. Eichorn - 2020 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 41 (2):329-362.
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