Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato

New York, US: Oup Usa (2012)
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Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato explores a Socratic intuition about belief, doxa -- belief is "shameful." In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Vogt shows how deeply this proposal differs from contemporary views, but that it nevertheless speaks to intuitions we are likely to share with Plato, ancient skeptics, and Stoic epistemologists



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How do philosophers in the Socratic tradition think about doxa, belief? It is argued that belief is, for Plato's Socrates as as well as for the skeptics and Stoics, a deficient cognitive attitude. On this conception of belief, knowledge does not involve belief. The Introduction sketches wa... see more

Why Beliefs Are Never True: A Reconstruction of Stoic Epistemology

According to the Stoics, beliefs are not evaluated as “true” or “false.” This aspect of Stoic epistemology, though rather stark, has not been noted by interpreters. The chapter is devoted to explaining and reconstructing it. The Stoic wise person does not hold any beliefs. In aiming for kn... see more

Concluding Remarks: Skepticism and Relativism

The Concluding Remarks offer an overview of ingredients relevant to Pyrrhonian skepticism and its history—and thus, ingredients relevant to a perspective that is defended as plausible throughout the book: a commitment to Socratic investigation and epistemic caution, engagement with metaphy... see more

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Katja Vogt
Columbia University

Citations of this work

Stoicism.Dirk Baltzly - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Elusive Third Way: The Pyrrhonian Illumination in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty.Roger E. Eichorn - 2020 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 41 (2):329-362.
Socrates’ Warning Against Misology.Thomas Miller - 2015 - Phronesis 60 (2):145-179.
Sceptical Rationality.Jan Willem Wieland - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):222-238.

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