Authors
Rico Vitz
Azusa Pacific University
Abstract
In this paper, I clarify Descartes’s account of belief, in general, and of judgment, in particular. Then, drawing upon this clarification, I explain the type of direct doxastic voluntarism that he endorses. In particular, I attempt to demonstrate two claims. First, I argue that there is strong textual evidence that, on Descartes’s account, people have the ability to suspend, or to withhold, judgment directly by an act will. Second, I argue that there is weak and inconclusive textual evidence that, on his account, people have the ability to form a judgment directly by an act will. I conclude by suggestion that understanding the position Descartes actually endorses (which I call ‘negative direct doxastic voluntarism’) has implications, more broadly, for contemporary participants in the doxastic voluntarism debate.
Keywords Descartes  belief  will
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ISBN(s) 1053-8364
DOI 10.5840/jpr_2010_4
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Killer Robots.Robert Sparrow - 2007 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (1):62–77.

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Descartes on Will and Suspension of Judgment: Affectivity of the Reasons for Doubt.Jan Forsman - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Istvan Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: pp. 38-58.
A Spinozist Aesthetics of Affect and Its Political Implications.Christopher Davidson - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Istvan Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press. pp. 185-206.

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