Philosophy of Chemistry against Standard Scientific Realism and Anti-Realism

Philosophia Scientiae 19-1 (19-1):99-113 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, it is suggested that philosophy of chemistry can be seen as having quite a central role in the post-Kuhnian philosophy of science in general, and in analysing the scientificc realism vs anti-realism debate in standard philosophy of science, in particular. The post-Kuhnian philosophy of science construes science as a practice rather than a network of statements. It is argued that practical realism can avoid the shortcomings of both standard scientific realism and anti-realism. An important recent book, B. Bensaude-Vincent’s & J. Simon’s Chemistry — The Impure Science [Bensaude-Vincent & Simon 2008] is analysed, and the position of the authors is interpreted as a kind of practical realism.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 107,499

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Chemistry as a practical science.Peeter Müürsepp - 2016 - Foundations of Chemistry 18 (3):213-223.
Chemistry as a practical science: Edward Caldin revisited.Peeter Müürsepp - 2015 - Foundations of Chemistry 18 (2):113-123.
The Problem of Realism in Vihalemm.Juho Lindholm - 2024 - Acta Baltica Historiae Et Philosophiae Scientiarum 12 (1):37-71.
Getting ontologically natural.Sami Pihlström - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3):247-256.
The Anti-Induction for Scientific Realism.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):329-342.
Does Scientific Realism Matter?Carl Alan Matheson - 1986 - Dissertation, Syracuse University
Induction, Rationality, and the Realism/Anti-realism Debate: A Reply to Shech.K. Brad Wray - 2022 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 34 (4):243-247.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-23

Downloads
123 (#191,214)

6 months
14 (#295,556)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?