How to think about the free will/determinism problem

In Michael O'Rourke, Joseph Keim Campbell & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science. MIT Press. pp. 314--340 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter proposes an approach to the free will/determinism problem that addresses the issue of whether the apparent conflict between free will and determinism is real or not. According to common sense, man has free will; when a person makes a choice, he or she indeed has the choice thought to be had. However, who is to say that the choices one makes are not predetermined? For all we know, determinism might be true. Common sense either is not aware of, or does not take seriously, the thought of determinism. Nevertheless, as soon as a philosopher explains the thesis of determinism, common sense sees the problem: the truth of determinism means the absence of free will.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,271

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Arguments for incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
How free are you? The determinism problem.Ted Honderich - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 249.
Free will, determinism, and the theory of important criteria.Michael A. Slote - 1969 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 12 (1-4):317-38.
Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility.Gerald Dworkin (ed.) - 1970 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Determinism, Randomness, and Value.Noa Latham - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):153-167.
Common Sense, Strict Incompatibilism, and Free Will.Boris Rähme - 2013 - Philosophical Inquiries 1 (1):107-124.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-01-26

Downloads
131 (#135,520)

6 months
17 (#136,890)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kadri Vihvelin
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
Arguments for incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Five Marks of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references