In Michael O'Rourke, Joseph Keim Campbell & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science. MIT Press. pp. 314--340 (2011)

Kadri Vihvelin
University of Southern California
This chapter proposes an approach to the free will/determinism problem that addresses the issue of whether the apparent conflict between free will and determinism is real or not. According to common sense, man has free will; when a person makes a choice, he or she indeed has the choice thought to be had. However, who is to say that the choices one makes are not predetermined? For all we know, determinism might be true. Common sense either is not aware of, or does not take seriously, the thought of determinism. Nevertheless, as soon as a philosopher explains the thesis of determinism, common sense sees the problem: the truth of determinism means the absence of free will.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2013
Buy the book Find it on
DOI 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015936.003.0014
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,979
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
Arguments for Incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Five Marks of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
96 ( #121,580 of 2,505,137 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #60,150 of 2,505,137 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes