Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and ability to do otherwise: A reply to Fischer

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 343-372 (2008)
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There is one important point about which Fischer and I are in agreement. We agree that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. We disagree about the best way of defending that claim. He thinks that Frankfurt's strategy is a good one, that we can grant incompatibilists the metaphysical victory while insisting that we are still morally responsible. I think this a huge mistake and I think the literature spawned by Frankfurt's attempt to undercut the metaphysical debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists is a snare and a delusion, distracting our attention from the important issues.



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Author's Profile

Kadri Vihvelin
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Abilities to do otherwise.Simon Kittle - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):3017-3035.
Truthmakers and the Direct Argument.Charles Hermes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (2):401-418.
Leeway Compatibilism and Frankfurt‐Style Cases.Yishai Cohen - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):89-98.

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References found in this work

Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1981 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Ifs, cans, and free will: The issues.Bernard Berofsky - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues.Bernard Berofsky - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.

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