Does Deflationism Lead Necessarily to Minimalism about Truth-Aptness?

Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):81-98 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that deflationism about truth does not imply minimalism about truthaptness. The condition for truth-aptness can be strengthened and the disquotationalschema restricted without resorting to any inflationary conception of truth-theoretic notions.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

ISBN(s)

18971652

DOI

10.5840/pjphil2010415

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,423

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism.Massimiliano Vignolo - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):84-103.
Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns.Glen Hoffmann - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.
A Dilemma for the Weak Deflationist about Truth.Glen Hoffmann - 2007 - Sorites 18:129-137.
Minimalism and the value of truth.By Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497–517.
Normativity and deflationary theories of truth.Bruno Mölder - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):179-193.
Truth Pluralism, Truth Relativism and Truth-aptness.Michael P. Lynch - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):149-158.
Kant on Truth-Aptness.Alberto Vanzo - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126.
Minimalism and the Facts About Truth.Marian David - 2002 - In R. Schantz (ed.), What is Truth?
Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid.Stephen Barker - 2011 - In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. Cambridge University Press.
Deflating logical consequence.Lionel Shapiro - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):320-342.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
66 (#241,657)

6 months
7 (#418,426)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references