Zombie Mary and the blue banana. On the compatibility of the 'knowledge argument' with the argument from modality

PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8 (2002)
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Abstract

This paper is trying to show that it is not possible to use the Knowledge argument as independent evidence for the form of non-reductionism the Modal argument argues for. To show this, Jackson's famous 'Mary' thought experiment is imagined in a zombie world. This leads to the result that there are many problems in the Mary experiment, which cannot have anything to do with phenomenal Qualia, because the Zombie-Mary would encounter them as well, and once all these problems are accounted for, it is no longer clear whether a Zombie-Mary is conceivable at all. Finally, an alternative explanation for the strong non-reductive intuitions of the Mary experiment is discussed

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Tillmann Vierkant
University of Edinburgh

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.

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