How many meanings for ‘may’? The case for modal polysemy

Philosophers' Imprint 16 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The standard Kratzerian analysis of modal auxiliaries, such as ‘may’ and ‘can’, takes them to be univocal and context-sensitive. Our first aim is to argue for an alternative view, on which such expressions are polysemous. Our second aim is to thereby shed light on the distinction between semantic context-sensitivity and polysemy. To achieve these aims, we examine the mechanisms of polysemy and context-sensitivity and provide criteria with which they can be held apart. We apply the criteria to modal auxiliaries and show that the default hypothesis should be that they are polysemous, and not merely context-sensitive. We then respond to arguments against modal ambiguity. Finally, we show why modal polysemy has significant philosophical implications.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 107,286

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-07-13

Downloads
261 (#111,246)

6 months
25 (#140,308)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Barbara Vetter
Freie Universität Berlin
Emanuel Viebahn
Universität Hamburg

Citations of this work

Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Moral Constraints on Gender Concepts.N. G. Laskowski - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):39-51.
‘Ought’-contextualism beyond the parochial.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3099-3119.
Ambiguity and Zeugma.Emanuel Viebahn - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):749-762.

View all 29 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references