How do you know that you settled a question?

Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):199-211 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is commonly assumed in the philosophical literature that in order to acquire an intention, the agent has to settle a question of what to do in practical deliberation. Carruthers, P. has recently used this to argue that the acquisition of intentions can never be conscious even in cases where the agent asserts having the intention in inner speech. Because of that Carruthers also believes that knowledge of intentions even in first person cases is observational. This paper explores the challenge Carruthers’ argument throws up for accounts that also rely on the notion of settling a question for intention acquisition, but who also want to maintain at the same time that knowledge of intentions in the first person case is not observational.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Weakness of will as intention-violation.Dylan Dodd - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.
We-intentions revisited.Raimo Tuomela - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
Reasons and Intentions.Bruno Verbeek (ed.) - 2007 - Ashgate.
How We Know What We're Doing.Sarah K. Paul - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-24.
Taking on intentions.Chrisoula Andreou - 2009 - Ratio 22 (2):157-169.
Unconscious intentions.Frederick A. Siegler - 1967 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 10 (1-4):251 – 267.
Are intentions self-referential?Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (3):309-329.
Collective and joint intention.Raimo Tuomela - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (2):39-69.
Is an agreement an exchange of intentions?Joe Mintoff - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):44–67.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-24

Downloads
97 (#164,058)

6 months
6 (#202,901)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Tillmann Vierkant
University of Edinburgh

References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 37 references / Add more references