Abstract

In the Republic Plato seems to be committed to three theses, each independently plausible, but which, taken together cannot be held without inconsistency. They are: justice benefits the just individual; justice requires that the philosopher rule the state; the philosopher would benefit more by contemplating than by ruling the state. If it is a just requirement of Plato's state that the philosopher take control of it, this would seem to result in a diminution of his happiness by decreasing the time the philosopher can spend on his preferred activity of contemplation. But if the philosopher is sacrificing his happiness to rule the state, then justice, which requires him to rule, does not benefit him. Hence, we have the embarrassing situation of the life of Plato's prized group standing as a counterexample to the overarching moral project of the Republic. ;This problem involving the happiness of Plato's philosopher-kings is the focus of this dissertation. After setting forth the textual evidence for the problem, I go on the examine the various solutions posed by commentators. Finding none of these satisfactory, I then take up what seems to be the underlying reason for their failure. This I claim is a particular view of the philosopher, known in the literature as the contemplative view, according to which the philosopher is primarily interested in theoretical activity. This view, I argue, is not substantiated by the text of the Republic, and I offer an alternate view of the philosopher, derived from the Symposium. According to what I call the pedagogical view, philosophical activity is primarily an expression of the philosopher's erotic drive, which aims at creating virtue in others. Since the philosopher's most profound desire is to propagate virtue in others, we can readily understand how ruling benefits him. As ruler of the state the philosopher has the ideal forum through which to propagate virtue on a large scale. Hence, the philosopher achieves maximal happiness through propagation involved in ruling. Since the just command to rule benefits the philosopher, the consistency of the Republic is restored