Proof with and without probabilities: Correct evidential reasoning with presumptive arguments, coherent hypotheses and degrees of uncertainty

Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (1):127-154 (2017)
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Abstract

Evidential reasoning is hard, and errors can lead to miscarriages of justice with serious consequences. Analytic methods for the correct handling of evidence come in different styles, typically focusing on one of three tools: arguments, scenarios or probabilities. Recent research used Bayesian networks for connecting arguments, scenarios, and probabilities. Well-known issues with Bayesian networks were encountered: More numbers are needed than are available, and there is a risk of misinterpretation of the graph underlying the Bayesian network, for instance as a causal model. The formalism presented here models presumptive arguments about coherent hypotheses that are compared in terms of their strength. No choice is needed between qualitative or quantitative analytic styles, since the formalism can be interpreted with and without numbers. The formalism is applied to key concepts in argumentative, scenario and probabilistic analyses of evidential reasoning, and is illustrated with a fictional crime investigation example based on Alfred Hitchcock’s film ‘To Catch A Thief’.

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References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Practical reason and norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - London: Hutchinson.
The Uses of Argument.Stephen E. Toulmin - 1958 - Philosophy 34 (130):244-245.
Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.

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