Journal of Philosophy 118 (9):465-485 (2021)

Authors
Matthew Vermaire
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
Matti Eklund has argued that a new problem in metanormative theory arises when we consider the possibility of "normative counterparts"—normative concepts with the same normative roles as OUGHT and RIGHT, but with different extensions. I distinguish two versions of the problem, and propose a solution: when we attend to the attitudinal commitments involved in the possession and application of some normative concepts, we find that tolerance for the possibility of normative counterparts is rationally ruled out.
Keywords Eklund  normative concepts  normative counterparts  normative role
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DOI 10.5840/jphil2021118933
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References found in this work BETA

The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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