Abstract
Hannah Ginsborg has recently introduced a new kind of nor-mativity which is supposed to avoid the pitfalls of both non-reductionist and dispositionalist theories of meaning. Ginsborg calls her kind of normativity ‘primitive’, for, though it is not to be conceived of in purely naturalistic terms, it is nonetheless to be applied to states or facts that are not purely intentional or contentful in that they are ‘below the level’ of meaning facts. Primitive normativity provides an explanation of how we first come to grasp the meaning of an expression. This explanation, according to Ginsborg, is missing in both non-reductionism, for which the state of meaning is sui generis, and dispositionalism, which does not explain how we go from mere discriminating to genuine understanding and meaning. I wish to defend non-reductionism, first, by showing that Ginsborg’s account does not yield the kind of explanation it aims at and, second, by suggesting that non-reductionism does not preclude a constructive account of the philosophical nature of meaning.